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Two potentially contradictory trends have been identified as populations around 
the world have been ageing in recent years. On the one hand, improvement in 
health has led to non-abated increases in life expectancies. On the other, health 
conditions and disability have become seen, more than ever, as the main obstacle 
to longer working lives. This apparent paradox is at the core of policies aiming to 
encourage longer working life as various institutional settings (state pensions, 
disability benefits and unemployment insurance) interact with changes in health 
s t a t u s  a n d  l a b o u r  m a r k e t  c o n d i t i o n s .  P r e v i o u s  r e s e a r c h  h a s  h i g h lighted  the 
impact of financial incentives of pension systems across a number of developed 
economies (Gruber and Wise 1999, 2004) but much less is known on the role 
that other pathways to retirement and changes in health conditions have played. 
  The  UK  is  a  fine  example  of  these  interactions.  With  stricter 
unemployment benefits and relatively few early retirement schemes (Banks et. al 
2010),  disability  benefits  have  come  over  time  to  represent  an  important 
pathway  to  retirement.  At  the  same  time,  life  expectancy  has  been  rising 
continuously while measures of self-reported health or disability do not seem to 
exhibit similar falls. As a result, disability benefits have become on top of the 
policy agenda with reforms following each other at a very rapid pace since the 
mid 1990s: a major reform in 1995 was followed by important changes in 2000, 
2001, 2003, 2006, 2008 and lately 2010.   
When one considers the degree of policy interest for this issue, one could be 
surprised at the limited literature on the subject in the UK. The main reason 
b e h i n d  t h i s  i s  n o t  t h e  l a c k  o f  i n t e r e s t  f r o m  e c o n o m i s t s  b u t  m o re  the  lack  of 
suitable  data  that  combine  information  on  labour  market  situation  and 
comprehensive measures of health and disability. Most early work had to rely on 
self-reported measures of incapacity for work and benefit receipts. The obvious 
problem is that self-reported measure of disability could be affected by benefit 
receipt  and  offers  therefore  limited  explanatory  power  (Myers  1982,  Bound 
1991).  The  main  result  from  this  early  literature  (Doherty  1979,  Fenn  1981, 
Piachaud 1986, Disney and Webb, 1991) was that both disability benefits and 
self-reported disability were linked to the labour market conditions: increased 
unemployment seemed to lead to increased number of claimants of disability 
benefits and increased self-reported disability. More recent research (Benítez-
Silva et al. 2010) has confirmed this relationship between the business cycle and 
the  incidence  of  self-reported  disability  and  provided  more  insights  to  the 
mechanisms involved, showing that unemployment had a large impact on the 
outflow rate out of disability benefits. Increasingly, researchers have tried to go 
beyond measures of self-reported health to capture the impact of more objective 
measures of health shocks. Disney et al. (2006) have for instance used panel data 
to  construct  instruments  of  self-reported  health,  showing  that  these  health 
shocks were important predictors of movements in and out of paid work among  
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those approaching the state pension age in the UK. In an alternative approach, 
anchoring vignettes have been used to try and control for group o r c o u ntry-
specific reporting effects on subjective health and work disability, with particular 
application to international comparisons (see Kapteyn et al. (2007) or Banks et 
al. (2008) for example. 
This paper examines changes in health and disability related transfers in the UK 
over  the  last  thirty  years,  and  describes  how  they  are  related  t o  c h a n g e s  i n  
labour  force  participation.  The  objective  is  to  present  a  comprehensive 
description of the reforms to the institutional setting, along with available time 
series coming from administrative data on benefit receipt, cross-section or panel 
data on self-reported health and their interactions with labour force status. By 
providing systematic evidence on institutions and data, we hope to help future 
research providing a fuller picture of the trends over this period. We also present 
evidence on the impact of two large reforms to disability benefits in the UK that 
help shed light on the long-term changes in disability prevalence in the UK. 
Section  2  presents  the  evolution  of  transfers  targeted  towards  people  with 
disabilities in the UK, focusing on recent reforms and the distinctive features of 
these benefits compared to their equivalent in other countries. Section 3 shows 
the evidence available on the different pathways to retirement in the UK while 
section 4 presents evidence on various health measures, including mortality and 
self-reported  health,  and  contrasts  these  evidences  with  labour m a r k e t  
outcomes. Section 5 presents evidence on two major reforms of the UK disability 
benefit  system,  the  1995  reform  and  the  more  recent  Pathways–to-Work 





Disability is a difficult characteristic to define. The traditional approach in the 
literature  has  rested  on  the  pioneering  work  from  Nagi  (1965,  1991)  who 
identified three components of disability: a pathology, an impairment and an 
inability to perform expected activities.3 This approach leads to view disability as 
a  permanent  condition,  completely  separated  from  sickness,  defined  as  a 
temporary  incapacity.  This  distinction  between  permanent  and  temporary 
conditions has not been instrumental in the design of the UK benefit system. 
Historically,  as  this  section  will  describe  in  more  detail,  sick  and  disabled 
individuals were all covered by sickness benefits, the only distinction coming 
f r o m  d u r a t i o n  o f  c l a i m s .  A s  a  r e s u l t  t h e  f o c u s  h a s  b e e n  m o r e  o n  l o n g  t e r m  
sickness  than  on  ‘disability’.  In  order  to  facilitate  the  comparison  with  other 
countries, we present the benefits available both to short-term sick and to long 
term sick or disabled. 
                                                 
3 See Bound and Burkhauser (1999) for a review on these definitions and the implications for the 
measurement of the population with disabilities.  
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Transfers targeted towards long term sick or disabled in the UK are a complex 
set of benefits that have evolved over time and been relabelled multiple times. To 
clarify  this  institutional  settin g ,  w i t h  a  j u n g l e  o f  a c r o n y m s ,  it  is  helpful  to 
distinguish  four  types  of  ‘disability’  benefits:  work-related  injury  benefits, 
disability  insurance,  non-contributory  benefits  and  means-tested  benefits 
(Creedy and Disney 1985, Burchardt 1999).  
 
2.1. Work­related injury benefits 
Compensatory benefits, for injuries at work or during wars, were historically the 
first  ones  to  be  implemented  in  the  UK  with  the  enactment  in  1897  of  the 
Workmen’s Compensation Act, which established the legal liability of employers 
to compensate employees for loss of earnings capacity as a result of an accident 
or  disease  linked  to  employment  (Walker  1981,  Walker  and  Walker  1991). 
D u r i n g  W o r l d  W a r  I  a  s t a t e  s c h e m e ,  t h e  W a r  D i s a b l e m e n t  P e n s i o n ,  w a s  
i n t r o d u c e d  t o  o f f e r  c o m p e n s a t i o n  t o  v e t e r a n s  o f  H . M .  A r m e d  F o r c es.  It  was 
followed in 1948 by the Industrial Injuries Disablement Benefit (IIDB), set up by 
the National Insurance Industrial Injury Act 1946.4 Both schemes still exist today 
and have only been marginally changed over time.5 They offer more generous 
b e n e f i t s  t h a n  o t h e r  d i s a b i l i t y  b e n e f i t s ,  a r e  n o t  m e a n s - t e s t e d ,  and  can  be 
cumulated with other benefits.  
 
2.2. Disability and sickness insurance 
The second type of disability benefits is earnings replacement benefits. The UK 
schemes share some characteristics of other countries’ sickness and disability 
insurance but also have two defining features inherited from their origin.  
F i r s t ,  t h e y  a r e  n o t  r e a l l y  i n s u r a n c e  s c h e m e s ,  a s  g e n e r a l l y  u n d e rstood.  The 
welfare system put in place in the UK in 1948 largely followed the design of the 
Beveridge report (Beveridge 1942). It relied on an insurance principle, whereby 
eligibility to benefits was determined by contribution requirements, but benefits 
were not earnings related, unlike the US SSDI or examples in Continental Europe. 
As a result the system has largely been targeted at low income individuals for 
whom flat-rate benefits represented a large replacement rate.6 
Second,  the  UK  system  has  not  formally  recognised  permanent  disability 
conditions. The benefit set up in 1948 was called Sickness Benefit and offered a 
benefit  with  unlimited  duration.7 H e n c e  t h e  c o v e r a g e  f o r  d i s a b i l i t y  w a s  n o t  
                                                 
4 The rate of the IIDB in 2009–10 was £143.60 per week (or $12,000 annually) for an extent of 
disablement of 100% and those over 18. The benefit is reduced proportionally with the disablement. 
5 The IIDB was originally split into Industrial Injury Benefit (IIB) for the first 26 weeks of sickness and 
Industrial Disablement Benefit for longer durations. In April 1983 IIB was abolished and replaced for the 
first 8 weeks by employers Statutory Sick Pay (SSP) and Sickness Benefit for durations between 9 and 25 
weeks (see section 2.2 for more details on SSP). 
6 There is a short period between 1966 and 1980 when earnings-related Sickness benefits have been 
introduced but this social insurance experiment has been both limited and short-lived. 
7 The system introduced after World War II is also largely the heir of the general sickness insurance 
introduced by the National Insurance Act 1911. It provided sickness benefits payable for 26 weeks along 
with a disability benefit and some health care benefit. All these benefits were distributed through  
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distinguished  from  short-term  sickness,  and  only  duration  of  claim  could 
distinguish the long-term sick from the short-term sick.  
Table 2.1 presents the evolution of these schemes from 1948 to 2010 according 
to duration of incapacity while Box 2.1 summarizes the changes to the generosity 
of these sickness and disability schemes. In 1971  Invalidity Benefit (IVB) was 
split from Sickness Benefit but still followed the structure inherited from the 
previous scheme, whereby entry to IVB would be offered to those who had been 
o n  s i c k n e s s  b e n e f i t s  f o r  l o n g e r  t h a n  2 8  w e e k s .  I V B  o f f e r e d  a  h igher  level  of 
benefit than Sickness Benefit but without imposing another health test when 
entering IVB. The screening process at the time relied on a medical assessment, 
by a personal doctor, of the ability to conduct “suitable work”. 
In 1983 a major reform was introduced to transfer administration of sick pay 
c l a i m s  f r o m  S i c k n e s s  P a y  t o  e m p l o y e r s ,  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  e i g h t  w e e ks  of  sickness, 
increased to 28 weeks in 1986. Employers were mandated to pay Statutory Sick 
Pay (SSP), payments which would be reimbursed by the government through 
lower National Insurance contributions.8 For those who would not qualify to SSP, 








1971  Sickness Benefit 
1971-
1982  Sickness Benefit 









1995  SSP/ Sickness Benefit 
1995-
2008 
SSP/ Incapacity Benefit (IB) 
short term lower rate 
IB short term higher 
rate  IB long term rate 
2008-  SSP/ ESA  Employment Support Allowance (ESA) 
 
The  number  of  claimants  increased  slowly  until  the  mid-1980s  for  the  older 
working age individuals, when a sharp increase of IVB recipients was registered 
for all age groups. One can see in Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 the number of IVB 
                                                                                                                                            
approved Friendly Societies but the scheme largely paved the way for further state interventions (see 
chapter 2 of Creedy and Disney 1985 and Gilbert 1965). 
8 Control of SSP was made by self-certification of sickness from the part of employees, which has raised 
concerns when expenditures on SSP turned out to increase more rapidly than Sickness Benefit (Creedy and 
Disney, 1985 page 127).  
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recipients as a share of the 55-59, 60-64 and 65-69 age groups  for men and 
women. Between 1985 and 1996, the share of the 55-59 year old men on IVB 
almost doubled, from 10.9% to 20.0%.  
In 1995 a reform was introduced which replaced the IVB and Sickness Benefit 
schemes with Incapacity Benefit (IB). This maintained the “own occupation test” 
to qualify for the first 28 weeks of incapacity but replaced the “suitable work 
test” of IVB with an “all work test” to qualify for the higher rate IB. This new 
medical  screening  was  also  removed  from  personal  doctors  and  was  instead 
administered  by  medical  staff at  the  regional  level  and  commissioned  by  the 
scheme’s administration. The growth of the IB roll was stopped, even slightly 
r e v e r s e d  b u t  t h e  s t o c k  r e m a i n e d  h i g h ,  e s p e c i a l l y  f o r  y o u n g e r  i n dividuals.  In 
addition to these changes, IB was no longer paid to new claimants above the 
state  pension  age  (65  for  men  and  60  for  women,  at  the  time).  Individuals 
previously  typically  preferred  to  stay  on  IVB  than  to  receive  th e  b a s i c  s t a t e  
pension as the latter is taxable whereas the former was not. The new IB benefit 
excludes those above state pension age (at the time 60 for women and 65 for 
men) and is treated as taxable income. This is why the number of claimants of IB 
a g e d  a b o v e  t h e  s t a t e  p e n s i o n  a g e  d r o p s  m a r k e d l y  a f t e r  t h e  1 9 9 5  reform  in 
Figures 2.1 and 2.2.  
Figure 2.1 IVB/IB recipients as a share of population (males), by age group. 
 
Note: IV/IB claimants’ data from Anyadike-Danes and McVicar (2007), working age population 
from Family Expenditure Survey. 
 
The 1999 Welfare Reform and Pensions Act introduced further changes, with a 
tightening of the health test from April 2000 onwards and a reduction in the 
generosity of IB from April 2001. The new health test is called Personal 
Capability Assessment, which is designed to assess capacity for work instead of 






















































































The reform also increased the eligibility requirement for IB from having paid 
contribution in any year before the start of incapacity to having paid sufficient 
contributions in one of the last three years. Finally it introduced means-testing of 






Note: IV/IB claimants’ data from Anyadike-Danes and McVicar (2007), working age population 






Introduction of Sickness Benefit. Flat rate benefit, no distinction 
by duration of claims. 
1966  Introduction of earnings-related Sickness benefit. 
1971  Introduction of Invalidity Benefit (IVB). Higher rate for duration 
above 6 months. 
1972 reform  Introduction of Invalidity Allowances. Supplements for becoming 
disabled at younger age.  
1980  Abolition of earnings-related Sickness benefit.
1983/1986  Introduction of Statutory Sick Pay.
1995 reform  Incapacity Benefit (IB) replaces IVB. New claimants receive less 
generous Incapacity Benefit, which is taxable (unlike IVB). “Own 
occupation”  test  replaced  by  “Any  occupation”  test.  Regional 
medical test instead of personal doctor. No longer paid to people 
over state pension age. 
2001 reform  Increased contribution requirement to qualify for IB. Introduction 
























































































Piloting  of  a  package  of  reforms  consisting  in  increased 
conditionality,  increased  support  and  increased  financial 
incentives to return to work. 
2008 reform  Employment  support  allowance  (ESA)  replaces  IB  for  new 
claimants. 
2010 reform  ESA is applied to all existing IB claimants.
 
In  2003  the  New  Labour  government  decided  to  pilot  an  ambitious,  and 
expensive,  programme  to  incentivize  IB  claimants  to  return  to  work  called 
Pathways­to­Work.  The  programme  included  increased  conditionality  with 
mandatory work focused interviews, increased financial incentives to return to 
work and increased support with the provision of voluntary schemes designed to 
help disabled individuals to return to work. The scheme was evaluated in pilot 
areas and then expanded to the rest of the country (Adam, Bozio and Emmerson 
2011). 
In 2008 the Government announced a new scheme to replace IB, the Employment 
Support  Allowance  (ESA)  for  new  claimants.  This  new  scheme  incorporates  a 
stricter eligibility health test along with a redesign of the benefit rates. In the first 
13  weeks  of  claim,  the  claimant is  subjected  to  a  Work  Capacity Assessment 
which determines whether the individual is entitled to ESA. Among those found 
eligible for ESA, the Work Capacity Assessment distinguishes between those who 
have “limited capacity to work and are unable to follow work related activities” 
and the remainder who have “limited capacity to work but are able to follow 
work related activities”. For the last group claimants are mandated to attend the 
Pathways-to-Work programme. ESA will be progressively applied to all existing 
IB  claimants,  i.e.  existing  claimants  are  going  to  be  re-tested f o r  t h e  s t r i c t e r  
eligibility between October 2010 and 2014. 
 
2.3. Non­contributory benefits 
Whereas the previous disability benefits are only available to those who have a 
sufficient National Insurance contribution record, a set of benefits were created 
in the 1970s for individuals of working age, with congenital disabilities, and who 
did  not  qualify  for  the  contributory  scheme.  In  1975  the  Non­Contributory 
Invalidity Pension (NCIP) was introduced, offering a benefit of 60% of IVB to men 
or single women. In 1977 the scheme was extended to married women who were 
“incapable of performing normal household duties” under the name of Housewife 
Non­Contributory  Invalidity  Pension  (HNCIP)  but  at  lower  rate  than  the  NCIP. 
Both  NCIP  and  HNCIP  were  replaced  in  1984  by  the  Severe  Disablement 
Allowance (SDA) which stopped the distinction that was deemed discriminatory 
against women. It was subsequently abolished in 2001 for new claimants. 
I n  t h e  1 9 7 0 s  a  n u m b e r  o f  s c h e m e s  w e r e  a l s o  d e s i g n e d  t o  o f f e r  b e nefits  to 
compensate the extra cost endured by disabled individuals, either in the form of 
carers or the extra cost of mobility. In 1971 the Attendance Allowance (AA) was 
created  for  those  who  required  personal  assistance  and  in  1976  a  Mobility  
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Allowance (MA) was introduced for those who had difficulty moving around. Also 
in 1976 an Invalid Care Allowance (ICA) was introduced for those who could not 
work because they had to stay at home to care for a disabled relative.9 In April 
1992 the Disability Living Allowance (DLA) replaced MA and AA for those who 
had become disabled before the age of 65, while AA was kept for those aged over 
65. In terms of total expenditure, DLA represents the biggest transfer targeted 
towards people with disability in the UK. In 2006-07 it represented £9 billion of 
expenditure, approximately 0.7% of national income. If one adds the £4 billion of 
AA  and  £1.2  billion  of  CA,  the  non-contributory  disability  benefits  represent 
more than 1% of national income. With the June 2010 Budget, the government 
plans to cut DLA spending by re-examining the health of existing claimants. The 
details or this reform are not known at the time of writing. 
 
2.4. Means­tested benefits 
A number of means-tested benefits targeting poor household have provisions 
that include premiums for disability. Income Support (IS) on ground of disability 
for instance offers a premium for low-income households containing at least one 
disabled individual.  
Another  example  is  Working  Tax  Credit  (WTC),  the  UK  equivalent  of  the  US 
Earned Income Tax credit (EITC), has also a supplement for disabled workers, 
and has a less onerous hours rule than that applied to non-disabled childless 
adults, with a further premium for severely disabled. Housing Benefit (HB) is 
another means-tested benefit with additional income for those with disability 




Given  the  complexity  of  pathways  into  retirement,  it  is  important  to  put  the 
changes  to  disability  schemes  in  the  wider  context  of  other  reforms  to  state 
pension schemes and unemployment schemes. Presenting data on pathways into 
retirement requires long panel datasets where each individual can be followed 
from  work  into  retirement  status.  The  UK  does  not  have  comprehensive 
administrative data such as the ones available for Germany (see Borsch-Supan et 
al.,  this  volume)  but  we  can  shed  light  on  these  transitions  using  three 
approaches: cross-sections from Family Expenditure Survey (FES) and Labour 
Force  Survey  (LFS),  one-year  economic  transitions  from  LFS  and  the  longer 
panel from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). 
 
3.1. Cross­section evidence on economic activity 
Two representative surveys provide good information on participation in the 
labour market in the UK. The FES goes back to 1968 and from 1975 onwards, the 
LFS offers large samples of British households with a full description of their 
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was associated with a large increase in the unemployed and the  retired. The 
share  of  those  reporting  being  sick  did  not  increase  immediately.  However, 
starting in the mid-1980s, the share of 55-64 year old reporting being inactive 
because of sickness increased markedly, in line with the increase in disability 
benefits recipients observed in Figure 2.1. Over the last ten years the increase in 
employment  rate  of  this  group  has  largely  been  at  the  expense  of  the 
unemployed,  and  only  marginally  at  the  expense  of  those  reporting  health 
problems. As a general remark, the share of those inactive because of sickness is 
always  much  larger  than  those  looking  for  work,  even  when  the  official 




Sources: 1968 to 2009 Family Expenditure Survey. 
 
3.2. One­year transitions from LFS 
One advantage of the LFS since 1992 is that survey respondents are asked about 
their economic position quarterly in five successive waves. This provides us with 
a one-year panel dataset from 1993 onwards allowing us to present evidence on 
transitions from employment into inactivity. Figure 3.3 presents the evolution of 
these short-term transition rates for 60 to 64 year old men. The most striking 
fact  over  the  period,  especially  since  the  late  1990s,  is  the  reduction  in  the 
transition  rate  from  employment  into  retirement.  This  coincides w i t h  t h e  
significant  increase  in  the  employment  rate  of  this  group  over  the  period. 
Transitions to unemployment and disability have declined over the early 1990s 
a n d  s t a b i l i s e d  a t  a  l o w  l e v e l  s i n c e .  T h e r e  i s  h a r d l y  a n y  e v i d e nce  from  these 
statistics that the 1995 reform has had much impact on the transitions through 
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retirement behaviour of this age group which, over this period, is increasingly 









Sources: Quarterly Labour Force Survey 1993-2008. 
 
Figure 3.4 presents similar evidence by looking reversely to the previous activity 
of newly retired individuals, i.e. individuals who declare that they are retired in 
one year but were not in the previous year. From the mid-1990s to the days 























































































































































































increased markedly: whereas in 1994 only 54% of newly retired men were 
coming directly from employment, this share reached 67% in 2008. This has 
been matched by a similar decrease of newly retired men coming from 
unemployment, whose proportions were halved from 20% to 10%. On the other 
hand there is only limited evidence of reductions in those coming from long-term 
sickness or disability. From 1994 to 2001 the proportion is increasing, from 25% 
to 35% while a decline is evident in the more recent years down to 23% in 2008. 
 
3.3. Evidence from BHPS 
T h e  s h o r t - t e r m  t r a n s i t i o n  r a t e s  f r o m  t h e  L F S  p r o v i d e  a  g o o d  b u t   limited 
description of the pathways to retirement that individuals might experience. It is 
possible  to  imagine  that  transitions  to  unemployment  cascade  into  disability 
before retirement and that short-term transitions do not capture these effects. In 
order to shed light on these long-term transitions, we use a long panel dataset, 
the British Household Panel Survey, which surveys 10,000 individuals every year 
since  1991  and  up  to  2007.  Although  we  have  access to  seventeen w a v e s  o f  
B H P S ,  t h e r e  a r e  o n l y  f e w  c o h o r t s  t h a t  w e  c a n  f o l l o w  f r o m  a g e  5 0  t h r o u g h  
retirement. We have selected the cohort born between 1938 and 1942 who were 
aged 49 and 53 in 1991 and aged 65 to 69 in 2007. In Figure 3.5 we present the 
evolution of self-reported economic activity for a sample of men from this cohort 
who were in paid work in 1991. Between age 50 and 55, inactivity is largely 
dominated by  unemployment,  whereas disability  becomes  a  more  substantial 
aspect from age 55 onwards up to much older ages. Nonetheless the decrease in 
employment over the 50-69 age group is still largely dominated by the increase 
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In Figure 3.6 we present similar statistics to Figure 3.4 but using the long panel 
of the BHPS as opposed to the short panel of LFS data. Those who were retired in 
2007 transited largely directly from employment: 64.5% of retired men aged 65-
69  in  2007  were  in  employment  before  retiring  compared  with  63.3%  for 
women. This leaves still a significant share that transit through unemployment 
and disability: 25.0% of men aged 65-69 came from disability against 13.8% for 
women.  Disability  is  an  ever  more  important  transition  for  women  as  the 
increase in labour force participation of women has reduced the other form of 
inactivity while increasing eligibility to disability benefits. 
Figure 3.6 Last activity of those retired in 2007, Cohort born 1938­1942 
 
Sources: British Household Panel Survey 1991-2007. 
Note: Those who are inactive throughout the panel are included in “other”. 
 
Figure 3.7 takes full advantage of the long panel from the BHPS by presenting 
evidence on transitions from employment into retirement and distinguishing the 
different pathways. The large majority of men and women aged 65-69 are either 
still in work or have transited directly from employment to retirement (75.6% of 
men and 78.4% of women). This is not to say that spells of unemployment or 
disability  are  rare,  as  a  significant  proportion  of  men  transit t h r o u g h  
unemployment (11.3%) and disability (8.9%). It is however much less common 
to  experience  multiple  transitions  from  unemployment  to  disability  before 









































Sources: British Household Panel Survey 1991-2007. 
Note: The sample includes all those aged 49 to 53 and in work at the start of the panel (in 1991) 
and retired at the end (aged 65 to 65 in 2007). Less than 1% of the 49-53 years old working in 





This  section  aims  to  provide  evidence  on  long  term  trends  in  health  using 
measures  of  mortality  rates  at  different  ages  and  self-reported  measures  of 




There  are  two  advantages  in  using  mortality  data.  First,  mortali t y  i s  a  w e l l  
defined  concept  and  it  is  therefore  easy  to  present  comparable  information 
across countries. Second, mortality rates are available over long periods and can 
be matched with historical data on labour force participation. However mortality 
data have also very obvious limitations for our purpose: they are not individual 
data, and do not allow assessing individual specific health shocks to labour force 
participation. And perhaps even more importantly, morbidity is a very different 
issue from disability or incapacity to work, which is more likely to matter to 
explain trends in labour force participation. England and Wales life tables are 
available from 1841 onwards by age and sex and by period and cohort.10 We use 
in this section period data for ease of comparison with other countries.   
                                                 
10 Mortality rates calculated on a “period basis” do not account for future changes (typically 
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Figure 4.1 and 4.2 show the evolution of period mortality rate of English and 
Welsh men and women at age 55, 60 and 65. Until the 1970s, there was only a 
m i n o r  r e d u c t i o n  i n  m o r t a l i t y  r a t e s  f o r  m e n  a t  a g e  5 5  a n d  6 0  a n d a l m o s t  n o  
improvement at age 65. During that decade men mortality rates started falling 
rapidly, especially at older ages. The fall in mortality rates is less impressive for 
women, but as Figure 4.2 makes clear, women have experienced much lower 
mortality rate than men and much earlier decline in mortality at older ages.  
Figure 4.1 Age­specific mortality rate for English and Welsh men 
 
































Figure 4.3 presents two-year mortality rates by age for both men and women 
comparing the period data from 1960 and 2005. Mortality rates increase steeply 
by age and are higher for women but the gap between men and women has got 
smaller  since  1960,  men  having  enjoyed  a  somewhat  larger  reduction  in 
mortality than women. Whereas the 5% two-year mortality rate was reached at 
61 for men in 1960, it was only attained at age 70 in 2005. For women, the age of 
the 5% two-year mortality rate increased from 68 to 75 over the same period.  
Figure 4.3 2­year mortality rate for male and women 
 
Sources: England and Wales life tables, GAD; computations from the authors. 
Figures 4.4 and 4.5 show the age of equal mortality rate over time computed 
u s i n g  o n e - y e a r  m o r t a l i t y  r a t e s  ( “ i s o m o r t s ” ) .  T h i s  g r a p h i c a l l y  i llustrates  the 
ageing  process  as  an  increase  in  the  age  where  individuals  face t h e  s a m e  
probability  of  death:  being  a  British  65  year  old  man  in  1960  – w h e n  s t a t e  
pension age was already 65 – is equivalent in terms of mortality risk to being 
aged 74 today. Or reversely being 65 today is like being 55 in 1960. The increase 
i s  l e s s  p r o n o u n c e d  f o r  w o m e n ,  r e f l e c t i n g  a s  b e f o r e  t h e  l a r g e r  r eduction  in 
mortality for men, but is nonetheless impressive. For instance, being a 60 year 
old woman in 1960 – the then state pension age – is today equivalent in terms of 










































































Sources: England and Wales life tables, GAD; computations from the authors. 





Sources: England and Wales life tables, GAD; computations from the authors. 
Note: p represents the mortality rate of the isomorphs. 
 
4.2. Measures of self­reported disability 
Although the previous section highlights the large improvement in average life 
expectancy, the ability to continue economic activity at older age is more likely to 
b e  a f f e c t e d  b y  h e a l t h  c o n d i t i o n s  t h a t  a r e  n o t  o b v i o u s l y  r e l a t e d  to  morbidity. 
































series as they have only been recently added systematically to survey on ageing. 
As a result, analysis of such measures, over the time period we are looking at 
here, is not possible. Going forward, however, the fact that ageing studies such as 
the Health and Retirement Study, the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing and 
the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe now routinely collect 
objective measures of physical functioning such as walking speed, grip strength, 
chair stands, balance tests and lung function, along with cognitive performance 
tests  and  huge  batteries  of  questions  on  doctor  diagnosed  diseases  and 
limitations  in  activities  of  everyday  living,  means  that  an  analysis  based  on 
o b j e c t i v e  m e a s u r e s  o f  h e a l t h  a n d  f u n c t i o n i n g  s h o u l d  b e  a  p r i o r i t y  f o r  f u t u r e  
research.   
 
For  our  purpose  here,  however,  there  is  useful  information  on  self-reported 
health from the General Household Survey (GHS), which surveys annually 10,000 
household in the UK from 1971 to 2006. In Figure 4.6 we show the proportion of 
men reporting limiting long-standing illness, the notion closest to the accepted 
definition of disability, by different age groups. Two facts are striking. First, over 
this thirty year period the share of men reporting some disability is relatively 
flat,  despite  the  large  improvement  in  health  (at  least  as  measured  by  the 
improvements in mortality rates). Second, this proportion of individual saying 






Source: General Household Survey 1972-2006. 
 
The presentation of time-series averages by age group, however, tends to mask 
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we present the proportion of men reporting limiting long standing illness by age 
at ten year intervals. The share of self-reported disability is steeply increasing by 
age at every period but although it was increasing at every age between 1977 
and 1997, the latest year in our data exhibits a marked reduction for ages above 
51. In Figure 4.8 we plot the same data with respect to specific age mortality 
rates  for  each  year  and  the  same  time-patterns  emerge.  Similar  evidence  for 
women is presented in Figures 4.9 and 4.10. The changing rate of disability for 
given levels of mortality probability is something that we will return to in later 












Sources: General Household Survey 1972-2006 and GAD mortality tables. 













































































































































Sources: General Household Survey 1972-2006 and GAD mortality tables. 





































































































































In order to summarize the evidence on labour force participation, benefit receipt 
and the health measures we have discussed previously, we present in Figures 
4.11  and  4.12  indices  of  these  measures  alongside  each  other  for  men  and 
women respectively. Both figures look at the evolution from 1972 to 2006 for the 
age group 55-59. Mortality is declining constantly over the period and does not 
seem to be related with any other trends. One interesting fact comes from the 
c o r r e l a t i o n  b e t w e e n  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  c l a i m a n t s  o f  d i s a b i l i t y  b e n e f i t s ,  t h e  s e l f -
reported  limiting  long-standing  illness  and  the  overall  change  in  non-
employment that is observed among men. Non-employment increased sharply in 
the  early  1980s,  peaking  after  the  1992  recession.  The  IB  claimant  count 
increased slowly over the period before a rapid growth in the early 1990s and a 
strong reversal after the 1995 reform. Although it is difficult to make precise 
i n f e r e n c e  f r o m  t h e s e  c o r r e l a t i o n s ,  t h e  t r e n d  i n  s e l f - r e p o r t e d  disability  is  also 
hump shed around the 1995 reform, laying grounds for claims that self-reported 
disabilities reflect as much the impact of being in receipt of a “disability benefit” 




Note: Indices 1 = 1972; LLSI stands for limiting long-standing illness. 
 
Figure 4.12 presents similar evidence for women. The graph is dominated by the 
large increase in receipt of disability benefits, reflecting the increased eligibility 
of women to contributory disability benefits. Labour force participation is clearly 
on an increasing trend in that age group, except during the early 1980s when the 
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Figure 4.12 Health measures and labour force participation, women 55­59 
 
Note: Indices 1 = 1972; LLSI stands for limiting long-standing illness. 
 
 
Figures 4.13 and 4.14 contrast two ways of presenting ageing and labour force 
participation. The first panel shows the employment rate by age for three years 
a t  a  t e n  y e a r  i n t e r v a l ,  w h i l e  t h e  s e c o n d  p a n e l  p r e s e n t  t h e  s a m e  data  by  the 
mortality rate at that specific age. In Figure 4.13 the employment of British men 
exhibit the characteristics that we have highlighted previously: a large drop in 
e m p l o y m e n t  a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  r e a c h i n g  t h e  s t a t e  p e n s i o n  a g e  ( a g e  6 5)  and  a 
significant drop at all ages between 1978 and 1988. The recent period appears 
favourably with an increase in the employment rate at all ages, but especially 
between 64 and 69. The second panel on the other hand highlights that these 
changes have taken place during a period of rapid decrease in mortality. For a 
given mortality rate, employment rates are now lower than at any other date, 

























































































Sources: Labour Force Survey. 
 
This is also the case for women, as shown by Figure 4.14. Only at the youngest 
ages, below age 55, is it possible to see the increasing participation of women 
counteracting the decline in employment for a given mortality rate.   
These  figures  provide  a  vivid  illustration  of  the  meaning  of  ageing  in  our 
developed societies where age takes in effect different meaning and are related 
to  a  recent  analysis  of  Shoven  (2010),  who  discusses  using  mortality  risk  or 
remaining life expectancy as better measures of age than years-since-birth for 
the purpose of social security analysis and design. The limit of this approach in 
our  context,  however,  that  mortality  risk  measures  do  not  capture  fully 
functioning ability and therefore err on the side of putting too much emphasis on 





































Sources: Labour Force Survey. 
 
Another more powerful way of looking at the same underlying data from Figures 
4.6 to 4.13 is to combine it into one graph showing evolution of employment and 
self-reported health over time for a given mortality rate. Figure 4.15 presents the 
non-employment rate and measures of self-reported health over time for males 
at the age corresponding to a one percent mortality rate in the relevant year. As 
one would expect from the analysis in earlier sections of this paper, the reference 
age for the comparison constantly shifts upwards - in 1975 a 1 percent mortality 
rate was observed for men aged 53, whilst in 2008 this age had shifted to 61. 
  Both health measures, i.e. the share of men reporting long-standing illness  
and the share reporting a limiting long-standing illness, have increased over time 
































as a whole, long-standing illness increased by two-thirds, limiting long-standing 
illness  increased  by  half,  but  non-employment  almost  quadrupled,  holding 
mortality probabilities constant. It is also worth noting that at the beginning of 
the period the rate of non-employment was only half the rate of disability as 
measured by limiting long-standing illness. Yet, by the end of the period non-
employment rates were higher than disability rates by ten percentage points. 
These diverging trends are particularly apparent towards the beginning of the 
period (late 1970s and early 1980s) when non-employment was rising very fast 
while self-reported health measures were not, and also in the more recent years, 





Sources: Labour Force Survey, General Household Survey, computations from the authors. 
Note: LLSI stands for limiting long-standing illness, LSI for long-standing illness. Both the LLSI 
and LSI are three-year moving averages. 
 
Another possibility using these associations between age specific mortality rates 
a n d  e m p l o y m e n t  r a t e s  i s  t o  c o m p a r e  c o u n t r i e s  a t  v a r i o u s  p o i n t s  in  time.  In 
Figures 4.16 and 4.17 we compare the case of France, the UK and the US between 
1968 and 2006. In 1968, the UK and the US have very similar employment rates 
for  given  mortality  rates  whereas  by  2006,  the  UK  experience  much  lower 
employment rates than the US for mortality rates above 1%. Albeit the fact that 
the UK had in 1968 lower employment rate than the US after age 65, the British 
males had at that time higher mortality rates, conditioning on age, than American 
ones. On the other hand in 2006, British males have seen their mortality rates 
d r o p  t o  t h e  l e v e l  o f  t h e  A m e r i c a n s  a n d  t h e r e f o r e  e x p e r i e n c e  m u c h  lower 


















Source: Enquête Emploi, Labour Force Survey, Current Population Survey, Human Mortality 
Database. 
 
France had in 1968 relatively high employment rates at older ages, still lower 
than the US and the UK, but with a similar pattern. However, already in 1968, 
French males experienced lower mortality at a given age than American and 
British males. This leads to much lower employment rate in France than in the 
US and the UK for a given mortality rate in 1968. By 2006, the lower mortality 
r a t e s  o f  F r e n c h  m a l e s  i s  s t i l l  v i s i b l e  b u t  e m p l o y m e n t  r a t e s  a t  older  age  has 
dropped further leading to much bigger difference with the other two countries, 
especially at low mortality rates. For instance for a 1% mortality rate, the French 
males have in 2006 an employment rate of 12% against 61% for the UK and 72% 










































The evidence presented so far relies heavily on times series but does not show 
any  causal  impact  that  policy  targeted  on  disability  benefits  could  have  on 
employment  and  retirement  patterns  of  individuals,  in  particular  those  who 
report some form of incapacity to work. This section presents evidence from two 
reforms of the UK disability benefits: the 1995 reform which intended to make 
the  health  test  stricter,  while  the  Pathways-to-Work  programme  which  was 
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5.1. The 1995 reform 
Incapacity benefit replaced IVB and sickness benefit in April 1995. The 
effect of the reform was to reduce the benefit’s generosity in a number of ways 
and to tighten the eligibility requirements.11  
The reduction in generosity was realised by a number of different changes. First, 
the  reform  reduced  the  rate  of  benefit.  IB  is  paid  at  three  different  rates 
according to the length of the period of incapacity. Short-term lower rate IB has 
replaced sickness benefit for people not eligible for SSP. A short-term higher rate 
of ICB is payable from week 29 to week 52. In spite of its name, this is less 
generous than IVB. Long-term IB, which is as generous as IVB, is only payable 
from week 52. Second, the generosity of the age additions has been reduced. 
Previously,  someone  would  have  been  eligible  for  an  age  addition  to  their 
invalidity pension if the period of incapacity began before age 59. Since 1995 
they are only eligible for an age addition if the period of incapacity begins before 
age 45. In addition, the age additions are payable after week 52, when long-term 
ICB  begins,  rather  than  after  week  28.  Third,  IB  became  taxable  from  1995 
onwards.  This  brings  it  into  line  with  the  other  main  benefits  (retirement 
pensions and unemployment benefits) and income support, which are subject to 
income tax. However, compensatory disability benefits (war disability pension 
and industrial injuries disablement pension) and extra costs disability benefits 
(disability  living  allowance,  attendance  allowance)  remain  not  subject  to  tax. 
Fourth, unlike IVB, long-term IB is not payable to anyone over state pension age, 
although people who start receiving short-term IB before state pension age can 
continue to do so for the full 52 weeks. 
The  tightening  of  eligibility  requirement  mostly  came  about  with  the 
replacement of the ‘suitable work test’ that applied to IVB recipients after 28 
weeks by the ‘all work test’. Instead of an assessment of a person’s ability to 
perform jobs that it was reasonable to expect them to do given their age, health 
and  qualifications,  the  ‘all  work  test’  required  an  assessment  of  the  person’s 
ability  to  do  any  kind  of  work.  The  all  work  test  involved  an  ‘objective’ 
assessment  of  the  level  of  difficu l t y  t h e  p e r s o n  h a d  i n  p e r f o r m ing  different 
physical and mental activities (for example, walking up and down stairs, bending 
a n d  k n e e l i n g ,  c o p i n g  w i t h  p r e s s u r e ) .  P o i n t s  w e r e  a w a r d e d  f o r  t h e  degree  of 
difficulty they had performing each activity, with a minimum total number of 
points necessary to be deemed incapable of work. A second change is that the all 
w o r k  t e s t  i s  c a r r i e d  o u t  b y  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  m e d i c a l  s e r v i c e  r a t h er  than  the 
individual’s own doctor. As with IVB, the claimant has the right to appeal for 
their case to be heard by a social security appeals tribunal.  
The first evidence one can gather on the 1995 reform is to look at the change in 
inflows into the IVB/IB rolls. Given that the reform has made qualifying for the 
                                                 
11 The changes affected only new claimants after April 1995. Those people already entitled to 
receive invalidity benefit continued to do so under the old rules.   
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benefit harder and that the generosity of the benefits has been  reduced,  one 
c o u l d  e x p e c t  t o  s e e  c h a n g e s  i n  i n f l o w  r a t e s  i n t o  t h e  s c h e m e .  F i gure  5.1 
represents the number of claimants to IVB and IB whose claim duration is less 
than one year. This is a relatively good proxy for the inflow rate although it is 
affected during the 1980s by the introduction of SSP. The latter has led to a 
d e c r e a s e  i n  i n f l o w s  t o  I V B  b y  s h i f t i n g  s h o r t - t e r m  s i c k  i n t o  t h e  e m p l o y e r s ’  
sickness scheme. In 1992 the recession hits the UK very acutely and this seems to 
have led to a peak in inflows onto IVB. The 1995 reform is associated with a 





Sources: IV/IB claimants’ data from Anyadike-Danes and McVicar (2007). 
 
Disney,  Emmerson  and  Wakefield  (2003,  2006)  examined  the  relationship 
between health and employment in the UK using panel data from the British 
Household  Panel  Survey  from  1991  to  1998.  They  used  a  fixed-effects 
conditional  logit  model,  instrumenting  self-reported  general  health  using 
responses to questions about specific health problems (following Bound et al., 
1999). Older age, reaching state pension age, and deteriorations in health were 
a l l  f o u n d  t o  l e a d  t o  i n c r e a s e d  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  l e a v i n g  w o r k .  T h e y  also  tested 
whether  the  1995  reform  strengthen  the  relationship  between  health  and 
employment by estimating co-efficient on health stock interacted with treated 
g r o u p .  T h e  e s t i m a t e d  c o e f f i c i e n t s  w e r e  p o s i t i v e  b u t  n o t  s t a t i s tically  different 
from zero at conventional levels of statistical significance. 
As an alternative and using the same dataset, we have run a probit retirement 
model among those in work, controlling for health stock. We plot in Figure 5.2 
the year dummies before and after the reform. The coefficients for men do drop 
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Note: Figure shows estimated marginal effects of year dummies from a probit retirement model 
among those in work in the previous wave, also controlling for health stock (from Disney, 
Emmerson and Wakefield, 2003), a cubic in age, regional unemployment rate, whether own 
their home outright, and dummies for reaching the state pension age and being in a couple. 
Model estimated on individuals aged 50 to 64 in 1991.  
 
5.2. Pathways–to­Work reform 
Although the 1995 and 2001 reforms were associated with the ending of the 
increasing trend in numbers receiving disability benefits, the stock of recipients 
remained at a high level. As a result a new programme, called Pathways-to-Work, 
designed to help claimants return to work, was implemented. It comprised three 
components: an increase in financial incentives to return to work with the ability 
to keep (approximately) 50% of the disability benefit for up to 12 months after 
returning to work; increased conditionality of benefits with mandatory work-
focused interviews; and voluntary schemes to help beneficiaries manage their 
health problem more successfully. Initially the programme was applied to those 
moving on to disability benefits (rather than existing claimants) and this impact 
of  this  programme  on  new  claimants  was  piloted  and  has  been  thoroughly 
evaluated (see Adam et al. 2011).  
The programme was first piloted in three large areas in October 2003 and four 
further large areas in April 2004. Later on the scheme was expanded to other 
areas of the country, in various phases. We present in Figures 5.3 and 5.4 the 
outflow rate at 6 months out of IB in the pilot areas and subsequent expansion 
a r e a s .  A f t e r  t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  t h e  p r o g r a m m e  t h e  e x i t  r a t e  o u t  of  benefit 
increased substantially in each in the treated areas. This provides convincing 
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although there is some evidence that the effect become smaller as it was rolled 
into subsequent areas. Adam et al. 2011 have shown that the impact on exit out 
of benefit has been concentrated on durations less than one year, suggesting that 
the programme has mostly been successful in bringing forward exit out from 
benefit among those who would have left within one-year of receipt, rather than 
r e m o v i n g  f r o m  t h e  d i s a b i l i t y  r o l l s  t h o s e  w h o  w o u l d  o t h e r w i s e  h ave  received 
b e n e f i t s  f o r  l o n g e r  t h a n  a  y e a r .  U s i n g  a  d i f f e r e n c e - i n - d i f f e r e nce  strategy,  the 
authors show that the programme has had a significant effect on the probability 
to return to work in the two groups of pilot areas, but that this positive effect has 
been  limited  to  those  who  do  not  report  a  mental  health  problem a n d  w a s  
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Figure 5.4 Six months outflow rate out of IB in the expansion areas 
 
Sources: administrative data on benefit flows, DWP. 
 
The  evaluation  of  this  programme  highlights  that  outflows  from  benefit,  and 
more specifically back to employment, do matter considerably. Furthermore they 
are not necessarily the same: the study shows that while the impact on benefit 
receipt  did  not  persist  beyond  12  months  the  employment  impact  was  still 
significant at 18 months. Even if policymakers have tended to concentrate on 
stricter eligibility with the hope of reducing inflows to benefit, the case for an 




Over the last thirty years pathways to retirement have changed substantially in 
the UK. They have been dominated by spells of unemployment in the late 1970s, 
with  then  an  increased  importance  of  disability  spells  from  the  mid-1980s 
onwards. Pathways to retirement through unemployment have been reduced in 
the early 1990s, while disability spells have started to be less common from the 
mid-1990s onwards. At the end of the period – before the financial crisis – the 
direct route from work to retirement was increasingly more common.  
The empirical evidence on the underlying causes of these changes is still mixed. 
There is weak evidence of unemployment and disability reforms’ effects on the 
routes to retirement, but the general economic conditions seem to have been 
important driving forces during the entire period. Changes in health measures do 
not provide convincing explanations for these trends: mortality has been falling 
over  the  period  without  any  link  to  the  share  of  the population r e p o r t i n g  i l l  























































































































































































though that self-reported disability is associated with changes in the number of 
disability claimants. 
There is also evidence that recent reforms have also had an impact. The 1995 
reform was associated with, at the very least, the halting of the previous growth 
in the rate of in-flow onto IB (and possibly also a fall in the percentage describing 
themselves as having a limiting long-standing illness). Evidence from the pilots 
of the Pathways-to-Work programme suggests that those moving onto disability 
benefits moved off these benefits faster than they would otherwise have done as 
a direct result of the programme. This programme was also found to have an 
enduring impact on subsequent employment rates. While the recent financial 
crisis and associated recession is likely to lead to much attention being focused 
o n  g e t t i n g  t h e  n e w l y  u n e m p l o y e d  b a c k  i n  t o  p a i d  w o r k ,  t h o s e  w h o   receive 
disability benefits and who could potentially return to the labour market may 
still need assistance. 
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